Hardening
Baselines implemented consistently
Hardening and securing Microsoft products in the cloud and on-premises. Focus: typical attack scenarios, common vulnerabilities, and an implementation-ready approach – including Microsoft tooling.
Hardening‑Workflow
- ✓BaselineTarget configuration (policies, baselines, RBAC)
- ✓DriftDetect deviations (CSPM, config audits)
- ✓Enforcementtechnical enforcement (Policy/GPO/MDM)
- ✓EvidenceLogging, reports, exceptions with rationale
Goal: hardening as a program with measurable security levels and usable audit evidence – not a one-time measure
- ✓OutcomeBaseline + exception register + continuous compliance
- ✓RisikohebelIdentity/privileged access, Tier-0 protection, logging & response capability
- ✓EvidencePolicies/reports/runbooks instead of PowerPoint
Cloud: tenant and Azure hardening
| Control | Technical implementation | Evidence / proof |
|---|---|---|
| CA Baseline (MFA, device compliant, geo/risk) | Conditional Access policies incl. named locations, risk-based CA (if licensed), break-glass accounts excluded | Policy Export, Sign‑in Logs, MFA Registration Reports |
| Phishing-resistente MFA | FIDO2/passkeys, Authenticator number matching, enable CAE | Authentication Methods Report, Sign‑in Details |
| PIM for all privileged roles | JIT-Activation, Approval/Justification, MFA on activation, Alerting | PIM Audit Logs, Role Assignments, Access Reviews |
| Disable legacy auth | Block legacy protocols, SMTP Auth only if justified; enforce modern auth | CA Policy, Sign‑in Logs (legacy), Message trace |
| Privileged Access Workstations | Admin access only from hardened admin devices / separate accounts | Device Compliance, CA device filter, Inventory |
| Azure Landing Zone / Guardrails | Management Groups, RBAC‑Model, Network Hub/Spoke, Blueprint/ALZ | MG Tree, RBAC Exports, Architecture Decision Records |
| Azure Policy (Policy as Code) | Baseline initiatives, Deny/DeployIfNotExists, CI/CD for policies | Policy Compliance Reports, Repo/PR Evidence |
| Secrets & Keys zentral | Key Vault, RBAC, Private Endpoints, Rotation | KV Access Policies/RBAC, Diagnostic Logs |
| Logging verpflichtend | Diagnostic settings: Entra, Azure Activity, Defender, Key Vault, Storage, Network | Log Analytics/Sentinel Tables, Data Ingestion Summary |
| Defender for Cloud / Defender XDR | Secure Score, Vulnerability Mgmt, Attack Path Analysis (if available), Alert routing | Secure Score Reports, Incidents, Recommendations Exports |
Attack scenarios and vulnerabilities
Token theft / consent phishing
Conditional Access
MFA/phishing-resistant, session controls, risk-based policies
Misconfiguration in Azure (CSPM findings)
Landing‑Zone‑Guardrails
Management Groups, Standard‑Policies, Naming/Tagging
Insufficient logging and retention
Logging blueprint
Sources, parsers, normalization, KQL standards
Retention‑Tiering
Hot/Warm/Archive, cost models
Data exfiltration via collaboration
Externes Sharing „by design“
B2B settings, access reviews, CA for guests
On-premises: AD, server and endpoint hardening
| Control | Technical implementation | Evidence / proof |
|---|---|---|
| Tier‑Modell (0/1/2) | Separate admin accounts, jump/PAW, admin separation by criticality | AD Gruppenstruktur, GPO Export, Admin Logons |
| LAPS / Local Admin Controls | Windows LAPS, no identical local admin passwords, rotation | LAPS Policies, Event Logs, Compliance Report |
| NTLM/SMB Hardening | Restrict NTLM, SMB signing, disable SMBv1, prioritize Kerberos | Security Baseline Report, GPO Export |
| Protected Users / Authentication Silos | Schutz gegen Credential Delegation; restriktive Logon‑Rights | AD Objektkonfiguration, DC Security Logs |
| Kerberos Hardenings | AES-only where possible, minimize delegation, planned krbtgt rotation | AD Settings, Change Records |
| Patch and vulnerability program | Ring model, maintenance windows, EOL tracking, regular scans | Patch Reports, Scanner Findings + Remediation Tickets |
| ASR/EDR Baseline | Defender for Endpoint, ASR rules, Tamper Protection | MDE Baseline Compliance, Alerts/Incidents |
| WDAC / App Control (where suitable) | Allowlisting for critical systems (Tier-0/servers) | Policy Deployment Evidence, Block Events |
| Credential Guard / LSASS protection | Virtualization‑based Security, Protected Process Light (PPL) | Device Compliance, Event Logs |
| Immutable backup/recovery | Offline/immutable backups, regular restore tests, separate admins | Restore test protocols, Backup Logs, RTO/RPO |
Attack scenarios and vulnerabilities
Credential Theft → Lateral Movement → Domain Dominance
Typical: admin credentials on workstations, missing tiering, insecure service accounts.
- ✓AD tiering (Tier 0/1/2), admin path strictly separated
- ✓PAW / Privileged Access Workstations, jump hosts, no internet use
- ✓LAPS/Windows LAPS, Kerberos hardening, delegation hygiene
Insecure default configuration (servers/clients)
Missing baselines, local admin rights, excessive attack surface (macros, script hosts, SMB settings).
- ✓Microsoft Security Baselines / Security Compliance Toolkit
- ✓Attack Surface Reduction, Controlled Folder Access (where possible)
- ✓WDAC / App Control, PowerShell logging, TLS hardening
Patch gaps on internet-exposed systems
Patch runbook
Maintenance windows, pre-checks, rollback, monitoring
Reduce exposure
Reverse proxy, network segments, MFA gateways
Domain controllers & Tier-0 assets
Tier-0 must be operated as a separate security zone – including dedicated monitoring and recovery procedures.
- ✓DC hardening, backup/restore (System State), and regular DR tests
- ✓MDI sensors, event forwarding, centralized alerting
- ✓Separation of duties and strict change control
Hardening as a program – not a one-time project
Controls by layer
- ✓Identity: CA baseline, PIM/JIT, admin tiering, disable legacy auth
- ✓Device/server: baselines, ASR/WDAC, LAPS, Credential Guard
- ✓Cloud: landing zones, policy, RBAC, private endpoints, Key Vault
- ✓Data: labels, DLP, retention, eDiscovery/audit
- ✓Detection: use-case catalog, log source list, alert tuning, SOAR runbooks
Approach for exceptions
- ✓Exception register: rationale, risk, compensation, expiration date
- ✓Technical compensation: additional detection, stricter monitoring rules
- ✓Review: monthly exception reviews with CISO/SOC/platform
- ✓Evidence: decision record + ticket + relevant logs/reports
The goal is a controlled deviation – not a silent erosion of the baseline.
Example playbooks
Entra / Identity
- ✓CA baseline (MFA, device compliance, risk-based)
- ✓PIM roles + approval flow
- ✓Break-glass tests & alerting
Endpoint/Server
- ✓Security baselines + drift reports
- ✓ASR/Attack Surface Reduction in wave rollout
- ✓Local admin rights via LAPS
Cloud Governance
- ✓Policy initiative sets (CIS-oriented)
- ✓Privileged access for Azure resources
- ✓Log retention + cost model
Validation & Continuous Compliance
Hardening is only effective if deviations are detected and remediated. That is why a continuous “check-fix-prove” cycle is required: measure → remediate → prove.
- ✓Measure: Secure Score/compliance trends, policy compliance, TVM findings, coverage
- ✓Remediate: defined owners, change windows, rollback plan
- ✓Prove: evidence artifacts + review record
What would you like to do now?
XELANED specialists are available at any time for the next steps. Together, we prioritize topics, clarify dependencies, and choose an approach that fits your environment both technically and organizationally.
Project planning
We discuss scope and dependencies and create a robust implementation plan.